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Abstract 
This paper examines the longstanding debate on government expenditure–economic growth nexus based on 
two opposing theories (i.e., Wagner’s Law and Keynesian theory) focusing on the Free State (FS) province 
in South Africa using both bivariate and trivariate models estimated for the period 2001:Q1 to 2014:Q4. 
Time-series on population per capita is used as a third variable in the multivariate to obviate the ‘omitted 
variable’ problem and erroneous conclusion on the existing causative links among variables. The long-run 
relations and causal links were tested employing the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL)–bounds testing 
approach and Toda-Yamamoto causality test. Our results show a bi-directional causal link between total 
provincial government expenditure (PGE) and economic growth (real GDP) in the short run, while the real 
GDP Granger-causes PGE in the long-run. We also find a unidirectional causal flow from population growth 
to both GDP and PGE in the short-run, suggesting that demographic factor plays a key role in explaining a 
rise in total PGE. Other evidence reveals a long-run income elasticity ranging from 0.99 to 1.2% suggesting 
that a 1% rise in real GDP in the FS province can cause PGE to rise by 0.99 – 1.2%.  The result on ‘voracity 
effect’ shows that external shock could lead to an increase of about 0.49 – 2.12% in total PGE, in the short-
run. These findings provide concrete support for the adopted stringent fiscal consolidation stance by the 
provincial government to ensure efficient allocation of limited available fiscal resources, curb wasteful 
expenditure and reduce government size. Albeit, the bi-directional causal link between real GDP and PGE 
requires policymakers to prudently balance both current and future public expenditures in order not to crowd-
out output and labour productivity.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The interest to clearly understand the relationship between economic growth and government 
expenditure (or government size) is a phenomenon that has gained substantial attention in the academia and 
policy circle in both the developing and developed countries with a mixed conclusion. Thus, in the vast 
economics and public finance literature, two opposing theories fundamentally supporting the government 
expenditure-economic growth nexus namely Wagner’s law and Keynesian hypothesis, while the latter is 
widely accepted in public finance, the former is popular in the field of economics, and mostly used in the 
policy circle for formulating macroeconomic policies. 
While, the empirical works of Adolph Wagner (1883,1893) culminated into the influential Wagner’s 
law Wagner law of “increasing expansion of public and state activities”, which hypothesise the propensity of 
public expenditure to rise faster than income due to growth-enhancing factors such as economic development, 
technological advancement, progressive society, and so on. On the other hand, a widespread policy stance, 
particularly found in developing countries, is to use [rapidly increasing] government expenditure as a policy 
tool to stimulate economic growth and in the short-run based on Keynesian theory. According to Keynes 
                                                          
†1Manuscript completed: December 2016; first revision: August 2017; second revision: October 2017. 
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(1936), government expenditure is an effective counter-cyclical policy tool during an economic recession. 
By implication, government expenditure becomes a key policy instrument with an innate stabilizing function 
operating through a multiplier effect.   
Most importantly for policy design, to adopt an effective policy, it is imperative to empirically establish 
the nature and direction of a causal link in the government expenditure-economic growth nexus; validate the 
true relationship between national income and government expenditures given the complex and dynamics 
underpinning the relationship between these variables, rather than relying on a priori judgment to arbitrarily 
adopt the so-called growth-enhancing fiscal policies by increasing government expenditure.  
Up till now, a large number of studies assessing the economic growth–government expenditure nexus 
in relation to Wagner’s law in the extant literature are devoted mostly to developed and developing countries 
in the Asian and Latin America region, while very few empirical research focused on Africa countries, 
particularly South Africa which is generally viewed the most industrialized, and an emerging country in Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) region.  Conversely, the conclusion of earlier studies in this strand of literature is 
susceptible to wrong conclusions due to misspecification bias, inappropriate econometrics techniques and the 
influence of ‘omitted’ variable problems. Despite these weaknesses, few researchers have made some attempt 
to validate the relevance of Wagner’s law in a handful of cross-sectional and country-specific studies with 
mixed evidence, same as the findings reported in the international literature.  
This present study differs from prior empirical works since none of earlier studies has considered 
looking into the relevance of Wagner’s law or Keynesian theory, in the context of, the relationship between 
economic growth and government expenditure, from a provincial perspective.  Closest studies to our work in 
the international literature are the studies of Abizadeh and Yousefi (1988) on 10 states of the United States 
and Narayan et al. (2008) on Chinese provinces. Unlike existing studies on South Africa, a novel feature of 
this current study is the use of provincial-level data. Narayan et al. (2008:298-299) cited four advantages of 
using provincial data.  
This study contributes to the literature in three folds. First, it fills the current research gap by examining 
the long-run relationship and causal links between economic growth and government expenditure using 
provincial data for a South African province, i.e. Free State province. Second, unlike existing studies, we 
utilized both bivariate and multivariate model. In the trivariate model, population variable is used a third 
endogenous variable to avoid the problem of ‘omitted variable’, misspecification bias, and erroneous 
detection of a spurious causal link which is seemingly ignored in the few extant studies for South Africa. 
Third, to obtain a robust result, we estimated the five commonly-used functional forms of Wagner’s law. 
Possible long-run relationships and causal flow between selected variables were investigated using ARDL 
cointegration and Toda-Yamamoto causality tests respectively. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the trends in government 
expenditure and economic growth for the Free State province. Section 3 provides the theoretical framework 
for analysing the dynamic relationships between aggregate government expenditure and economic growth 
and also summarizes studies related to Wagner’s Law. Sections 4 and 5 detail the econometric techniques 
and empirical results respectively. Policy implications of the findings are discussed in Section 6. Section 7 
concludes.  
 
2. STYLISED FACTS: TRENDS IN GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE AND ECONOMIC 
GROWTH FOR FREE STATE PROVINCE 
 
A general trend commonly observed in most countries pertains to the rapid increase in government 
expenditure relative to economic activity due to political factors driving the former, rather market forces 
(Dilrukshini, 2009). This phenomenon is evident in the pattern of co-movement between government 
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spending and economic growth in the Free State province. A furtive glance at Figure 1, it is evident that 
government expenditure and economic growth tends to co-move in the same direction with a possibility of a 
long-run relationship, which is an empirical issue to be examined.  Beginning with trends in economic growth 
and national expenditure in South Africa as a whole, while the former has been relatively weak since post 
2007/08 global recession from 5.4% in 2007 to 0.1% in 2016, while the growth of  1.1% has been projected 
for 2017 (IMF, 2016), nonetheless, government expenditure is increasing a rapid pace. For instance, in the 
current policy on public spending, according to 2016 National Budget, is to enforce a strict fiscal discipline 
by implanting fiscal consolidation while shifting a greater proportion of the budget towards economic 
infrastructure investment (i.e. water, public transport and public broadband connections), tertiary education 
(postgraduate) and training, improved health services and social protection (mainly social grants). The main 
objective of the adopted fiscal consolidation is enforced by adopting cost-containment measures to (i) reduce 
public debt (as a percentage of GDP) to 46.2% in 2017/18, and (ii) shrink budget deficit to a sustainable level 
of about 2.4% by 2018/19 from 3.9% in 2015/16 financial year via cost by imposing an expenditure ceiling 
of R25 billion on the growing public sector wage bill (i.e. personnel sending) over the next three financial 
years. Also, tax revenue of R18.1 billion is anticipated to be raised in 2016/17, with an additional R15 billion 
in the following two consecutive years. 
Equally, based on the increase in provincial expenditure by 5.4% from 29.5 billion (2015/16) to 30.8 
billion in 2016/17, the Free State government in the 2016/17 Provincial budget trimmed the public spending 
over the next three financial years (MTEF) to R30.8 billion, R32.8 billion and R34.5 billion in 2016/17,  
2017/18, and 2018/19 through several fiscal consolidation strategies, which is expected to ceiled public 
expenses on non-core programmes to R35.8 million in 2016/17. The fiscal consolidation measures 
implemented are: periodic headcount of public servants to curtailed moon-lightning and ghost workers, in 
effect, curbing the growing wage bill. Also, limit recruitment into the public sector, streamlined the 
functioning of provincial government departments by identifying duplicated functions and integrate multiple 
public sector services. Following the implementation of the intergovernmental fiscal framework to improve 
the disbursement of national revenue (equitable shares) in 2000 to provinces to meet various government 
financial obligations (e.g. facilitate service delivery, support infrastructural and economic development), total 
government expenditure has grown from of R7.4 billion in 2000/01 to R14.2 billion in 2005/06. By the end 
of 2015/16, government expenditure had tripled to about R29.5 in the 2015/16 financial year.  
Further analysis of the government expenditures per provincial departments shows that a large 
proportion of the total expenditure is dominated by three components which are: education, health and social 
welfare. Specifically, using the available data, 16-year period analysis reveals that, on average, the largest 
share of total government expenditure is on education is about 39.5%, followed by health (26.4%) and social 
welfare (10.6%). In contrast, a lower percentage share of the total government expenditure is allocated to 
infrastructure expenditure (6.8%) and human settlement (4.7%).  Similarly, on average, the lowest share of 
government expenditure is allocated to agriculture (2%); sports, arts and recreation (1.6%); economic 
development (1.6%); governance (0.8%), protection and legal services (0.6%). It is worth noting that, while 
provincial government expenditure on education and health appeared to be normalised around 40% and 29% 
respectively since 2005, nonetheless, fiscal expenditure on social welfare has declined dramatically from 
almost 28% in 2005/06 to 3.4% in 2015/16. On the other hand, there is a  notable shift is observed in 
government expenditure on security and road transport with a steady rise from about 1.6% in 2008/09 to a 
peak of 8.3% in 2014/15. This remarkable increase could be attributed to the 2010 World Cup event held in 
the province. By and large, a long-run estimate depicts a lower share of government expenditure below 6%. 
This low public investment on infrastructure could partly explain the prevailing weak economic activity, 
growing unemployment rates and acute poverty level in the province (Ascaheur, 1986).   
Since 2000, expected provincial government expenditure rise faster than economic growth over the 
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period considered, this is consistent with Wagner’s theory of expanding government size (see Figure 2)2. 
After the adoption of the intergovernmental fiscal framework in 2000 by the national government, real total 
provincial government expenditure rapidly grew from 10.7% in 2000 to about 13% in 20043. During this 
period, the upsurge government expenditure lifts domestic economic growth from -2.4% in 2000 to 3.9% in 
2004. Surprisingly, while economic activity improved in 2005 as GDP growth peaked at 4.2%, albeit, a 
steadily decline (to 9%) in public expenditure is observable.  Notably, government expenditure has been on 
a downward decline since 2009, partly due to the emergent tight economic condition in the global economy 
due to 2007/8 recession and the adopted fiscal consolidation strategy at the national level.  
 
 
Figure 1: Real gross product (GDP) and total provincial 
expenditure (real) for FS, 2000-2014 
 Figure 2: Growth in total real PGE and real GDP for FS, 
 2000-2014 
 
 
 
Data source: FSPT IYM database; StatsSA; Author’s illustration. 
                                                          
2 In reference to Wagner (1883), factors that can explain rapid expenditure-led growth are: demographic factor 
(expanding population), aggregate demand for public goods and services, which is closely linked to increasing 
urbanization. For the Free State province, the observed growth in public expenditure could be ascribe to the shift in the 
provincial government’s policy to meet the National government’s pro-poor goals to: increase social security coverage,  
accelerate infrastructure (transport) development, facilitate regional industrialization by creating Special Economic 
Zones, support small enterprise establishments, investment in green energy, and undertake extensive preventive and 
rehabilitation of existing physical and economic infrastructure (2016 FS Province Budget Statement). 
3 The South Africa’s Equitable Share (ES) formula is a mechanism for transfer of funds from the National government 
to provincial (9 provinces) and local governments (consists of 278 municipalities) to support basic services including 
water and sanitation. The disbursement of equitable shares (i.e. national revenue) to provinces are calculated based on 
seven (7) weighted components, namely: education (numbers of enrolment, school age); health (population with/out 
medical aid support); social development (proportion of the population accessing social grants and ruralness); level of 
economic activity; backlog in public implemented programmes (health, education, rural development etc); basic services 
(population growth), and institutional funds. (National Treasury, IGFR) 
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 
According to Wagner’s law, there is a long-run relationship between government expenditure and 
income4, nonetheless, as the economy develops, a large proportion of the income of devoted to government 
expenditure due to increase in per capita income, which in turn, intensifies aggregate demand, for example, 
public goods and services (education and health), safety and security, good governance, technological 
investment, and so on. In the long-run, as real income increases, the share of government expenditure tends 
to rise faster relative to income, in effect, leading to large government size. Wagner’s postulation of rapidly 
increasing in the growth of government expenditure is caused by economic growth (national income) is 
widely accepted in public finance (Henrekson, 1990), hence, the treatment of the former as a behavioural 
endogenous variable (Singh et al. 1983).  Empirically, evidence supporting Wagner’s law indicates a 
unidirectional causality running from economic growth (national income) to government expenditure (public 
size). If Wagner’s law holds, from a policy perspective, government expenditure is not a reliable policy tool 
to stimulate economic growth. 
In Grundlegung der politischen okonomie (1893), Wagner presented three rationales for an expanding 
government size or an increasing share of government expenditure in national income, over a time period. 
First, economic development (industrialization) leads to substitution of private sector activity with the public 
sector to produce quality goods and services, as well as, prevent monopolistic behaviour of private sector to 
promote market efficiency. Hence, the societal need for regulations, administrative (e.g. governance) and 
protective functions amplifies the government’s role (or size) in a growing economy, as the society prosper. 
Other factors include: urbanization, population growth, need for legislations – legal rules to ensure proper 
governance, and communication. Second, growing income per capita leads to greater demand for income 
elastic public goods and services, such as improved health services, education, social grants, cultural and 
recreational activities. On this assumption, income elasticity relative to government expenditure is expected 
to be greater than unity. Third, technological advancement requires the government to undertake large 
projects considered too risky or not profitable by the private sector. Additionally, large government size, 
which is synonymous to high public expenditure is predominant in most countries given the ubiquitous 
perception that government play a critical role in harmonizing conflicts between private and social interests, 
resist exploitation by foreign interests and increase socially desirable investment.  
Empirically, although both Ram (1992:497) and (Henrekson, 1993:406) argued that Wagner’s law is 
explicitly a long-run phenomenon, without considering any possible co-movement between economic 
development and government size in the short-run (cited in Ashan et al. 1996:1055). But, in the literature, it 
is widely accepted that the existence of a long-run relationship suggests the possibility of a prevailing inter-
temporal relationship accentuated by a prima facie causative process between national income and 
government expenditures in the short-run (Holmes and Hutton, 1990; Ansari et al. 1997; Islam, 2001; Iyare 
and Lorde, 2004; Narayan et al. 2008). Thus, the precise knowledge on the direction of causality is important 
to adopt an effective policy stance. For example, a causative process validating Wagner law relegates 
government expenditure to a passive role, whereas, evidence of a causal flow consistent with Keynesian 
theory ascertain the significant role of government expenditure as a key policy variable to stimulate 
economic activities and development (Sing and Sahni, 1983:198; Loizoides et al. 2001:133).   
On the contrary, according to Keynes (1936), government expenditure is an effective counter-cyclical 
policy tool during an economic recession. By implication, government expenditure becomes a key policy 
instrument with an innate stabilizing function operating through a multiplier effect. For instance, high 
government [consumption] expenditure is considered to be useful during an economic recession (upswing) 
                                                          
4 In this paper, government expenditure is interchangeably referred to public spending (or government spending), while 
economic growth is referred to as national income (or income) based on the context of focal discussion.  
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when the government embarks on an expansionary (restrictive) monetary policy stance, this in turn, can lead 
to a simultaneous positive impact on aggregate production, demand for labour supply and job creation. Over 
time, effective demand rises, as per capita income of individual households increased owed to high labour 
productivity linked to significant employment growth.  
In the past decade, the Keynesian theory on the important role of government in the domestic economy 
has been widely adopted in developing countries to support the rationale for a large government size (i.e., 
public sector) due to market failures, and private sector’s inability to supply the large public goods 
(infrastructures) as a result of monopolistic and capitalist behaviour. Another reason why Keynes theory 
gained widespread popularity in most developing countries is attributed to the simplicity and practical 
application of the theory to formulate macroeconomic policies as well as display political commitments. For 
example, national government tends to increase its expenditure to stimulate economic growth in the short-
run during recessionary periods, which in turn, can lead to economic development (see, e.g., Lin, 1994; 
Ashan et al. 1996; Yasin, 2011; Abdullahi et al. 2007; Alexiou, 2009; Asghar et al. 2011; Alshahrani et al. 
2014; Garba et al. 2013; Gemmell et al. 2015; Sabir, 2015 and Lahirushan et al. 2015) and mitigate the severe 
effects of idiosyncratic shocks on the economy, e.g. war and natural disaster (Rodrik, 1998). Additionally, 
an intensive government spending on large projects, which can create temporary jobs indirectly, is indicative 
of staunch commitment by the national government from the voters’ perspective. 
 
 3.1 Theoretical Framework 
 
Although, Wagner’s law has enjoyed overwhelming empirical support in earlier studies (see, e.g. 
Peacock and Wiseman, 1961; Gupta, 1967; Goffman, 1968; Musgrave, 1969; Mann, 1980; Ram, 1986) 
documented in Birds (1970) and Henrekson (1993), yet the exact interpretation of Wagner’s conjecture 
remain elusive because no definite mathematical representation was proffered by Wagner (see, e.g. 
Klingman, 1980; Rao, 1989).  For instance,  Henrekson (1993) interpreted the be interpreted Wagner’s law 
as an increased share for the public sector in the total economy relative to per real income growth, in contrast, 
Musgrave’s (1969) viewed the law an increase in the share of government in national income or the absolute 
level of government.  As a result, the extant literature is dominated with five function forms of the law as 
interpreted in Eqs.1.1 to 1.5:  
 
( )GE f Y         (1.1): Peacock-Wiseman (1961) 
Y
PGE f
           (1.2):  Goffman (1968) 
Y
P
GE fY 
               (1.3):  Musgrave (1969) 
 
GE YfP P
               (1.4):  Gupta (1967) 
( )GE f YY 
          (1.5): Mann (1980) – modified version of Eq.1.1.   
 
whereGE  denotes government expenditure; Y  represents a real gross domestic product (GDP) and P indicates 
population growth; GE
P
     is the real total expenditure per capita; 
   
Y
P
 real income per capita, and GE
Y
   
represents real total expenditure as a share of real income.   
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According to the first proposition by Peacock and Wiseman (1961), government expenditure growth 
to be greater than economic growth (GDP), whereas, Goffman (1968) viewed the law as a higher rate of 
government expenditure relative to the growth in per capita GDP, as an archetype economy moves towards  
‘developmental or industrialisation phase’. Musgrave (1969) asserts that the share of government 
expenditure in GDP increases as income per capita grows during a ‘developmental or industrialisation 
phase’, whereas, Gupta (1967) interpreted taking into account population growth (urbanisation) linked to 
increased demand for income elastic public goods, and posits that government expenditure is a function of 
GDP per capita. Meanwhile, Mann (1980) maintains that the share of government expenditure in GDP is a 
linear function of economic growth (GDP).  
In some studies, an augmented version of the Peacock and Wiseman’s (hereafter, P-W) proposed by 
Pryor (1969) suggesting that the share of government consumption expenditure is expected to be higher than 
economic growth in developing countries have been considered in cross-sectional studies (see, e.g., Barth 
and Brady, 1987; Diamond, 1989; Landau, 1983,1986; Komendi et al. 1985; Barro, 1991; Afxentiou et al. 
1996; Kolluri et al. 2001) and country specific-studies (e.g. Ghali, 1997 for Saudi Arabia; Nikolaos et al. 
2004 for Greece; Tulshidharan, 2006 for India; Ho, 2007 for Japan; Ocran, 2011 for South Africa; Amin, 
2011 for Bangladesh; Maku et al. 2014 for Nigeria), with mixed empirical evidence supporting either 
Wagner’s law or Keynesian hypothesis or both.   
Essentially, establishing a long-run relationship is insufficient to affirm Wagner’s law (see, e.g., 
Ansari et al. 1997; Islam, 2001; Iyare and Lorde, 2004), but the direction of causality is necessary to 
determine a robust relationship. On the whole, if unambiguous support for Wagner's law is to be inferred, a 
unidirectional causality running from national income to government expenditures should be observed 
(Narayan et al. 2008:300).  
 
3.2. Empirical Evidence   
 
There is an extensive literature studying the relationship between government expenditure and income 
in a cross-sectional or country-specific framework using a simple to sophisticated econometric techniques 
to shed light on the long-run and/or short-run dynamic between these variables. Nonetheless, the conclusion 
from these studies remains inconclusive. Some studies, for example, Landau (1983,86), Grier and Tullock 
(1986), Barth and Brady (1987), Diamond (i989), Barro (1990,1991), Ho (2007), Asghar et al. (2011), and 
Ogundipe et al. (2013) all have reported a negative relationship between government expenditure (and its 
components) and income for both developed and developing countries. Conversely, a prima facie positive 
relationship between economic growth and government spending have also been reported by Ram (1986), 
Aschaeur (1986), Lin (1994), Yasin (2000), Abdullahi et al. (2007), Alexiou (2009), Alshahrani et al. (2014) 
and Garba (2013).  Meanwhile, Komendi and Meguire (1985) and Maku (2014) found no evidence.  
In the extant vast literature, a great number of empirical studies investigating the relationship between 
government expenditure and economic growth mostly focus on developed countries and their developing 
counterparts in the Asian and Latin American region, whereas, there is a dearth of research on sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) countries. Nonetheless, a survey of the literature focusing on SSA region provide mixed 
evidence on the validity of Wagner’s law from the few existing cross-sectional and country-specific studies, 
which is similar to ambiguous evidence reported for both developed and developing countries in other parts 
of the world.  An extensive survey of the existing literature on studies examining the GDP–GE nexus is 
presented in Table BII to BIV in the Appendix.  
Focusing on SSA studies, beginning with cross-sectional studies. In a panel regression of 23 SSA 
countries, Yasin (2011) investigate the impact of government expenditure on economic growth covering the 
period 1987 to 1997. The results of the fixed and random effects analysis show that trade-openness and 
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private investment expenditures exert positive and significant influence on economic growth, but the 
population growth rate influence on economic growth is statistically insignificant. Besides, Oteng-Abaiye 
(2011) considered five ECOWAS (Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria and Sierra Leone) countries using a 
panel cointegration test, and finds of cointegration between government expenditure and per capita income.  
On the other hand, country-specific studies by Tsauri and Odhiambo (2013) for Zimbabwe (1980-
2011); Thabane and Lebina (2016) for Lesotho (annual data:1980-2012); Danladi et al. (2015) for Nigeria 
(annual data:1980-2013); Ogbuagu and Ekpenyong (2015) for Nigeria (annual data:1970-2014) – all 
reported evidence supporting Wagner’s law employing the more superior autoregressive distributed lag 
(ARDL) bound testing approach developed by Pesaran et al. (2001) and combinations of Granger causality 
and Toda-Yamamoto non-Granger causality tests to affirmed a unidirectional causal flow from income to 
government expenditures. On the contrary, Salwindi and Seshamani (2016) used Juselieus and Johansen 
(1992) cointegration test to confirmed the law for Zambia over the period studied (annual data: 1980-2013), 
while Babatunde (2011) modelled the commonly cited five functional forms of Wagner’s law using annual 
data over 1970 to 2006 for Nigeria, by employing the novel ARDL and the superior Toda-Yamamoto 
causality test of (Toda and Yamamoto, 1995). Subsequent results indicate no evidence of cointegration 
among used variables, while the causality results provide no support for Wagner’s law but weak evidence 
for the Keynesian theory in most of the specified models.  
Focusing on studies related to South Africa, Ansari et al. (1997) examined the causal link between 
income and government expenditure focusing on South Africa, Kenya and Ghana employing the causality 
tests of Granger (1969), and Holmes and Hutton (1990). Using the traditional Engle and Granger (1987) 
cointegration test to affirm a long-run relationship between used variables, the causality test results support 
Wagner’s law for Ghana (1963-1988 period) only, while no causal link between real income per capita and 
per capita expenditure is found for South Africa (1957-1990 period) and Kenya (1964-1989 period) over the 
studied periods. Recently, Alimi (2014) re-assessed the causal relationship between government spending 
and national income in a panel of three African countries (Nigeria, Ghana and South Africa) over the period 
1970 to 2012 in a cross-sectional and time-series analysis using Johansen Fisher panel and Johansen-Juselius 
cointegration tests. The cointegration test result ascertained a long-run relationship among focal variables 
for Ghana, while evidence of no cointegration is observed in both Kenyan and South Africa. Also, causality 
tests indicate a bi-directional causal flow from national income to government expenditure from South Africa 
and Kenya, but a unidirectional flow consistent with Keynesian theory was reported for Ghana.  
On country-specific studies, Seeber and Dockel (1978) assessed the behaviour of functional 
expenditures over the period 1948-1975. Obtained results revealed that past expenditures and income are the 
main determinants of total government expenditures, and because the estimated income elasticities exceed 
unity, they concluded that Wagner’s law is partially confirmed for South Africa. Also, Abedian and Standish 
(1984) examined the sources of growth in national government expenditure taking into account various 
functional government expenditures over the period 1920 to 1982. They concluded that Wagner’s law applies 
to South Africa. Nonetheless, the results of both Seeber et al. (1978) and Abedian et al. (1984) validating 
Wagner’s law is not robust because of their failure to established the causative linkages between variables 
used (Rao, 1989) resulting in misspecification bias.  
Conversely, simply establishing a long-run relationship between used variables is insufficient or 
income elasticity is insufficient to validate Wagner’s law due to possible prima facie dynamic relationship 
between economic growth and total government expenditures (or other expenditure components) (Holmes 
et al. 1990). Also, the employed econometric technique used, that is, ordinary least squares (OLS) is 
inadequate to aptly unmask the complex relationship between variables studied. In this strand of study, a 
recent empirical study of Ocran (2011) finds that government consumption expenditure has a significant 
positive effect on real GDP for South Africa.   
Since 2000, subsequent studies have employed more sophisticated econometric models to unravel the 
9 
  
relationship between government expenditure and economic growth in South Africa, specifically testing the 
relevance of Wagner’s law for the country. For instance, Chang et al. (2004) used annual data spanning 1951 
to 1996 for seven developed and three developing countries in conjunction with Johansen cointegration test 
and Granger casualty test to identify both long-run relationship and temporal causal flow between economic 
growth and government expenditure, they reported evidence of no causal link between used variables, thus 
invalidating Wagner’s law for South Africa. Indeed, mixed results on Wagner’s law remain unsettled in 
recent studies utilizing more robust econometric techniques.  
In view of Gupta (1967) interpretation of Wagner’s law, Ziramba (2008) used historical data over 
1960 to 2006, as well as, ARDL and Toda-Yamamoto causality to examine long-run relationship and 
direction of causality between real per capita government expenditure and real per capita income. Obtained 
results provide evidence of a long-run relationship, however, a bi-directional causal flow between used 
variables was observed, suggestive of a feedback dynamic effect. The tentatively concluded that Wagner’s 
law finds no support in South Africa.  Meanwhile, in a times series analysis with data covering 1960-2007 
for South Africa, by applying the Johansen (1988) cointegration test, an error correction model (ECM) and 
Granger causality test to identify both long-run and short-run relationships, including the nature of causal 
flow in a multivariate specification, Alm and Embaye (2010) found a long-run relationship between per 
capita income and government expenditure - tax share and wage rate and government expenditure, as well 
as, a unidirectional causality running from income per capita to per capita expenditure, firmly support 
Wagner’s law, opposing earlier findings reported by Ziramba (2008) that employed a bi-variate model in 
line with Peacock-Wiseman’s (1961) assumption of the law.  Alms et al. (2010)  also considered the 
influence of external shocks on government expenditures, results show that external shocks positively affects 
per capita government expenditure, implying that external shocks are one of the influential factors 
responsible for the rapid increase in expenditure growth.    
Given the ambiguous conclusions on the validity of Wagner’s law, applying ARDL and Engle-
Granger causality test to annual data spanning 1950-2007, Menyah and Wolde-Rufael (2012), in simple 
Peacock-Wiseman ((hereafter, P-W (1960))  functional form of Wagner’s law re-assess the relationship 
between government expenditure and economic growth. At the same time,  an alternative P-W model was 
estimated from Keynesian theory’s viewpoint, where national income is treated as exogenous variables. They 
find evidence of cointegration between real GDP and government expenditure, as well as, the latter Granger 
cause government expenditure in both the long-run and short-run, without any feedback effect, i.e. a 
unidirectional causal flow, which strongly support Wagner’s law for South Africa. Also, the long-run income 
elasticity estimated by Menyah et al. (2012) shows an income elasticity ranging from 1.12 to 1.57, implying 
that a 1% increase in income leads to a 1.12 to 1.57% increase in government expenditure, in line with 
Wagner’s postulation of rapidly expanding government size resulting associated with income growth. 
Recently, Gadinabokao and Daw (2013) applied Juselieus and Johansen cointegration test, ECM and 
Engle-Granger causality test to annual data over 1980-2011 for South Africa. In a multivariate model, where 
gross fixed capital is included as a third explanatory variable, subsequent results indicate a positive and 
significant long-run association between income and government spending, while causality test affirmed that 
gross capital formation Granger causes economic growth, in contrast, there is a little evidence to conclude 
that income Granger cause government expenditure.  
Meanwhile, Odihambo (2015) applied ARDL to test for cointegration, ECM and Engle-Granger 
causality test to an annual time-series data over 1970-2013, in a trivariate model using the unemployment 
rate as a third endogenous variable. The obtained results confirm a long-run relationship between per capita 
income and government expenditure. Nonetheless, the causality test results suggest a unidirectional causality 
running from income to government expenditure in the long-run, and a bi-directional between income and 
government expenditure in the short-run. This finding concretely substantiates earlier conclusion of Ziramba 
(2008).    
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On the whole, the findings from burgeoning studies testing the validity of Wagner’s law can be 
grouped into four (4) distinct groups, which entails those that provide evidence supporting: (i) a 
unidirectional causal flow running from income to aggregate expenditure (or its component) in line with 
Wagner’s law; (ii) Keynesian views, where income Granger cause government expenditures (or its 
components), (iii) both Wagner’s and Keynesian hypothesis, suggesting a bi-directional causal flow between 
income and government expenditures, and indicative of a feedback effect which explains the complex 
relationship between these variables, and (iv) no inference of causal link between income and government 
expenditures, pinpointing the existence of a neutral relationship [or effect] in the government expenditures–
income nexus. See Tables BII to BIV in the Appendix for a systematic review of studies that found support, 
no support and mixed results for Wagner’s law. 
 
 
4. EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK, DATA AND ESTIMATION TECHNIQUE 
 
4.1. Empirical Framework 
 
To deduce robust evidence supporting the two opposing hypotheses discussed earlier, we attempt to 
capture both the long-run and short-run dynamic relationship between aggregate government expenditure 
and economic growth for the FS province by estimating five (5) variants of Wagner’s functional forms were 
estimated. We relied on the Peacock Wiseman (1967) view of the law depicted in Eq.1.1, we followed the 
standard procedure cited in the literature5 by re-estimating this equation in a multivariate model with the 
inclusion of population variable as a third endogenous variable to obviate the problem of “omitted” variable 
and misspecification bias.   The multivariate model is estimated as a functional form of Peacock-Wiseman 
model written in a reduced form as:  
 
    ( ,P)t t tGE f Y              (1.6)  
In the context of Wagner’s view, from, Eq.1.11, aggregate government expenditure for the FS 
province is assumed to be influenced by economic growth and increase in population. To investigate the 
simultaneously investigate both Wagner’s law and Keynesian theory, we specified two functional forms of 
the P-W model version, by interchangeably using aggregate expenditure, tGE  as an exogenous (endogenous) variable as postulated by Wagner’s law (Keynesian theory), while the former (latter) assumed 
economic growth, tY   be exogenous (endogenous) in the estimated trivariate model based on Peacock-Wiseman (1967) interpretation of the law. Using log-linear function form, the computed trivariate model 
based on the P-W are represented as:   
 
Model 1a: P-W (1961) model in line with Wagner’s law:   
t 0 2 3( ) ( ) ( )t t tln GE lnY ln P             (1.7) 
 
Model 1b: P-W (1961) model consistent with Keynesian theory:  
                                                          
5 See Murthy (1994) for detail discussion. In a panel regression, Ashan et al. (1992) includes budget deficit and money 
stock, while Loizides et al. (2004) add inflation in their estimated multivariate models. In addition, this procedure has 
become a norm to include more endogenous variables when testing for Wagner’s law in country-specific studies, 
popular variables used are: population (Kalam, 2009 for Bangladesh; Permana et al. 2012 for Indonesia), budget deficit 
to GDP ratio (Halicioglu, 2003 for Turkey), money supply (Cheng, et al. 1997 for South Korea), as well as, capital 
stock and labour (Govindaraju, 2011 for Malaysia), to mention a few.  
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t 0 2 3( ) ( ) ( )t t tlnY ln GE ln P             (1.8) 
 
Other alternative functional forms of Wagner’s law follows Eq. 1.2 to 1.5, estimated as:  
 
Model 2: Goffman (1968)  
0 2( ) tt t
t
Yln GE ln P  
      
      (1.9) 
Model 3:  Musgrave (1969) 
0 2
t t
t
t t
GE Yln lnY P  
              
      (1.10) 
Model 4: Gupta (1967)  
0 2
t t
t
t t
GE Yln lnP P  
              
      (1.11) 
Model 5: Mann (1980) – a modified version of Peacock-Wiseman model.  
0 2 ( )t t t
t
GEln ln YY   
       
      (1.12) 
 
From Eqs. 1.7 to 1.12, ln  denotes natural logarithm, and t are serially uncorrelated error terms with 
(0, )N properties, and t is the time index. By interpretation, although Wagner’s law posits a long-run 
relation between total government expenditure (government expenditure per capita and share of government 
expenditure in economic growth)  and real GDP (real per capita GDP), Wagner law only holds if the 
following conditions are satisfied:( i) real income elasticity coefficients is greater than unity (i.e.  2 1 ) 
for non-ratio versions (Eqs.1.7 and 1.9), greater than zero (i.e. 2 0 ) for ratio versions (Eqs. 1.10  to 1.12); 
(ii) a causal flow from real economic growth  (income) to aggregate government expenditure, (iii) variables 
should be stationary and (iv) error terms must be uncorrelated and homoscedastic.  Herenkson (1993) 
proposed the last two conditions due to critique of spurious regression (Granger and Newbold, 1974) 
resulting from the well-known unit-root problem because they failed to establish the stationarity properties 
of the data used in earlier studies prior 1990 testing the validity of Wagner’s law, (e.g. see, Landau, 
1983,1986; Barro, 1986).   Arguably, inferences from these earlier studies could be considered erroneous.   
Additionally, the negligence of these studies to establish the causative relations (for example, 
unidirectional, bi-directional or neutral) between national income and aggregate expenditure (or different 
expenditure components) utilised rendered the inferred conclusions on the competing theories inaccurate 
purely based on plausible unidentified feedback macro relations between used variables  (Rao, 1989; Hutton 
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and Holmes, 1993)6. Among the few studies for South Africa investigating Wagner’s law have used Gupta 
Model (see Ziramba, 2008), Peacock-Wiseman model (Menyah and Wolde-Rufael, 2012); Odhiambo (2015) 
used an augmented version of Goffman (1968) in a trivariate model by including unemployment rate as the 
third endogenous variable. Other multivariate studies on South Africa have used other variables in the 
context of Peacock-Wisemnan’s functional form, for instance, Gadinabokao and Daw (2013) include gross 
capital formation, but Chipaumire (2013) added money stock and real investment.  
 
 
4.2. Data. 
 
The intergovernmental fiscal framework (IGFR) in South Africa for disbursement of national revenue 
to other sub-national government spheres (i.e. province and municipalities) was fully established in 
2000/2001 financial cycle,  thus, the limited historical data on provincial government expenditures is 
insufficient to achieve our empirical aim.  To circumvent the issue of data paucity and spurious regression 
associated with loss of degrees of freedom, we employed interpolation technique to convert available annual 
data on regional GDP (1999–2015), provincial government expenditure (2000 – 2015) and population (2000-
2015) into quarterly data spanning the periods of 2001:Q4 to 2014:Q4.  
The regional GDP is measured at constant (2010=100) prices.  Nominal variables of regional GDP 
and provincial total government expenditure are deflated by the consumer price index (2012=100) to obtain 
real variables.  The series of real GDP is seasonally adjusted using ARIMA-12 model. The time-series data 
on the regional GDP, consumer price index (CPI) and population were retrieved from Statistics South Africa 
(Stats SA) at http://www.statssa.gov.za/. Data on the provincial government expenditures is extracted by 
Budget Management Directorate in the Free State Provincial Treasury (FSPT, available at 
http://www.dot.fs.gov.za/) from the In-Year-Monitoring (IYM) financial database. 
The motivation behind the use of the population time-series as the third endogenous variable in our 
trivariate model is in two folds. First, in addition to minimizing misspecification bias and influence of 
‘omitted variables’, this procedure is suitable to uncover a robust causative process in the aggregate 
government expenditure-real GDP nexus operating through a third channel. In this way, a bi-directional 
causality can be considered as a ‘strong causal relationship’ which confirms the dynamic and complex links 
in the studied nexus, while a unidirectional causal flow is referred to as ‘a causal relationship’. Second, the 
original view of Wagner’s law premised on countries going through industrialization (or economic 
development phase) consisting of a ‘rich progressive society’ due to urbanization. Simply put, demographic 
factors such as population is an influential determinant of government expenditure (Kormedi and Meguire, 
1985; Alm and Embaye, 2011), but yet to receive adequate empirical attention (Durevall and Henrekson 
2010).  
Intuitively, as the economy grows, an increase in per capita income usually leads to a population shift 
from the province towards urban areas, which in turn, increase aggregate demand for infrastructure-related 
public goods (e.g. water supply, sewerage, electricity, road network, hospitals, schools, and so on).  Lastly,  
a large proportion of working-age population generally accelerates economic growth, while a population 
with a significant proportion of young and elderly dependents not only influence growth negatively but 
increases social spending (Garba et al. 2013). Likewise, the combined effect of rapid population growth and 
urbanisation can result in a permanent and significant increase in government expenditure on health and 
education (David and Velenchik, 1992).
                                                          
6 Rao (1989) made the earliest attempt to empirically investigate the findings of Landau (1986) and Barro (1986); he 
concludes that the evidence from these studies are imprecise since the direction and the nature of causal flow between 
used variables are not determined.  
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4.3. Application of Econometric Techniques. 
 
To empirically investigative the long-run relationship and temporal links among the variable of 
interest, we specified all five Wagner’s functional forms using the novel econometric technique of new 
autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL or bound test) model developed by Pesaran et al. (2001).  
The rationale for employing the ARDL model to establish the long-run relationship among variables 
compared to other co-integration tests are as follows. First,  compared to other conventional multivariate co-
integration tests, the ARDL procedure yields a far more superior inference when using a finite sample or 
small sample data sizes (Narayan, 2005) as is the case in this study unlike the Engle-Granger (1987) approach, 
which suffers from considerable small sample bias (Mah, 2000). Second, the ARDL avoids the econometric 
burden of pre-testing for unit-roots and establishing the order of integration of variables as I(0) and I(1) 
associated with standard co-integration analysis. ARDL is applicable irrespective of whether the underlying 
explanatory variables are integrated of order zero (I(0)) or one (I(1)) (Pesaran et al., 2001). Second, 
endogeneity problems and inability to test hypotheses on the estimated coefficients in the long run associated 
with the Engle–Granger (1987) method are avoided. With the bound testing, the procedure is possible when 
the explanatory variables are endogenous and sufficiently to simultaneously correct for residual serial 
correlation. Third, ARDL has better statistical properties because it does not push the short-run dynamics 
into the residual term as in the Engle-Granger (1987) technique (Pattichis, 1999). Fourth, both the long-run 
and short-run parameters can be simultaneously estimated by the model.  Nonetheless, it has been pointed 
out that this procedure is inappropriate when the endogenous variable are I(2) series. In this case, the model 
will fail. Finally,  our predilection to use the ARDL is further motivated by the argument of Rao (1986:276) 
asserting that, in the presence of contemporaneous variables, the inclusion of more lagged variables in a 
system, can cause the number of bi-directional relationships to drop quickly, in effect, reduce the ambiguous 
results supporting bi-directional causality.   
For this study, the ARDL model estimated for the five Wagner’s function forms in Eqs 1.7 to 1.12 are 
as follows:   
 
Model 1a:   0 1 1 2 3 1 1 1
1 0 0
l l l
t t i t i i t i t t
i i i
GE G Y P ECT        
  
               (1.13) 
Model 1b:   0 1 1 2 3 2 1 2
1 0 0
l l l
t t i t i i t i t t
i i i
Y Y GE P ECT        
  
               (1.14) 
Model 2:   0 1 1 2 3 1 3
1 0
l l
t t i t t
i i t i
YGE GE ECTP       
                (1.15) 
Model 3:  0 1 2 4 1 4
1 01
l l
i t t
i it t t i
GE GE Y ECTY Y P      
                           (1.16) 
Model 4:  0 1 2 5 1 5
1 01
l l
i t t
i it t t i
GE GE Y ECTP P P      
                           (1.17) 
Model 5:  0 1 2 6 1 6
1 01
l l
i t i t t
i it t
GE GE Y ECTY Y      
                     (1.18) 
 
From Eqs. 1.13 to 1.18, the subscript, l  denotes the lag length, tGE  and  tY ,  tP are the first 
differences of logarithms of tG , tY  and tP respectively. 1tECT  is the lagged error-correction term 
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obtained from the long-run equations 1.7 to 1.12, and the 1 ,2 …6  are corresponding adjustment 
coefficients in the short-run. The significance of the F-statistic on explanatory variables will determine the 
direction of short-run causality, while the long-run causal effect will be shown by the t-statistic on the 
coefficient of 1tECT if only there is co-integration between government expenditure and real GDP.  In the 
case of no long-run cointegrating relationship between these variables, equations (1.13 to 1.18) will be 
estimated without the error-correction term and only the direction of the short-run causality will be 
determined. 
Note that, in contrast to the traditional Granger causality method, the ARDL as an unrestricted error 
correction based causality test allows for the inclusion of the lagged error-correction term (ECT) mainly to 
reintroduce any long-run information lost through differencing into the system in a statistically acceptable 
procedure (Menyah et al., 2012:203).  In the spirit of Granger and Newbold, (1974) long-run equilibrium can 
be established in Eqs. 1.13 to 1.18, only if a cointegration system exists, while the short-run behaviour of the 
variables can then be modelled using an error-correction procedure, which allows for both short-run dynamic 
behaviour and an error correction term to maintain the long-run equilibrium (Hendry, 1986).  
Therefore, to determine the existence of co-integration in the system, Pesaran et al. (2001) compute 
two sets of critical values are provided given significance level: one which is appropriate when all variables 
are (0)I  and the other is for all variables that are (1)I , thus covering all the possible classifications of the 
series into (0)I , (1)I  or mutually cointegrated. Notably, the asymptotic distribution of the F-statistic is 
nonstandard under the null hypothesis of no cointegration relationship between the examined variables, 
without recourse to whether the underlying explanatory variables are purely (0)I  or (1)I .  The null hypothesis 
of the cointegration       0 1 2 3: 0H  is tested against the alternative hypothesis of 
      0 1 2 3: 0H .  In this case, if the computed F-statistic exceeds the upper critical bounds value, a 
conclusive inference of cointegration can be made without the knowing the order of integration of the 
variables, in this case, the null hypothesis is rejected. If the F-statistic is below the lower critical bounds 
value, it implies no cointegration. Lastly, if the F-statistic falls into the bounds, then the test becomes 
inconclusive, in this case, the order of integration for the underlying explanatory variables must be known 
before any conclusion can be drawn.   
From Eqs. 1.13 to 1.18 testing Wagner’s law, the significance of the first differenced variables provides 
evidence on the direction of the short-run causation while the t-statistics on the one period lagged ECT term 
denotes long-run causation. Equally, a negative and statistically significant ECT term is an indication of 
causal flow from all right-hand variables to the corresponding left-hand side variables (Tasserven, 2011:313).  
Inference satisfying these provide further evidence and confirmation of the long-run and dynamic short-run 
relationships between the variables. In all other cases, where evidence of no cointegrated prevails, the inter-
temporal causality will be examined by estimating Equations Eqs. 1.13 to 1.18 without the ECT term. 
Noticeably, for our application, the asymptotic non-standard F-statistic under the null hypothesis is derived 
from bootstrapped critical values computed for small samples by Narayan et al (2005) based on the critical 
values for large samples provided by Pesaran et al. (2001).  
In what follows, we proceed to test the direction of causality between selected variables using a more 
robust causality test developed by Toda and Yamamoto (1995). The Toda-Yamamoto non-Granger causality 
test utilises a modified Wald statistic (MWALD) for the restrictions on the parameters of an ‘augmented’ 
vector autoregressive, VAR (k ) model, where k  is the lag length in the system. The MWALD statistic has 
an asymptotic chi-square distribution when a VAR  max( )k d is estimated. This procedure is superior to 
ordinary Granger causality tests because it ignores any possible non-stationarity or cointegration between the 
series outlined in Section 3 when testing for causality (Wolde-Rufael, 2005:896). Causality inference from 
Toda-Yamamoto non-Granger causality test is valid regardless of whether a series is (0)I , (1)I  or (2)I , non-
cointegrated or cointegrated of any arbitrary order. Typically, Granger causality test is susceptible to 
erroneous inference as noted by Ansari et al. (1997), and suffers from nuisance parameter dependency 
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asymptotically in some cases producing unreliable results (Babatunde, 2011).   
In this approach, Toda and Yamamoto (1995) proposed an ‘augmented’ vector autoregressive (VAR) 
model in the levels of the variables (rather than the first differences, as the case with Granger causality tests) 
thereby minimising the risks associated with the possibility of wrongly identifying the order of integration of 
the series. In this approach, a standard VAR is artificially augmented to determine the maximal order of 
integration maxd (where maxd is the maximal order of integration suspected to exist in the system), which is 
expected to be present in the model. Thereafter, VAR (k ) is estimated in levels with a total of max( )k d
lags. Once this is done, the coefficients of the last lagged maxd  vector are ignored (e.g., see Zapata and 
Rambaldi, 1997). According to Toda and Yamamoto (1995), for  1d , the lag selection procedure is always 
valid, at least asymptotically, 1k d   If  2,d  then the procedure is valid unless 1k  .  Toda and 
Yamamoto have proven that the modified Wald-statistic is valid regardless of whether a series is (0), (1)I I  
or (2)I  non-cointegrated or cointegrated of arbitrary order. The Wald-statistic is asymptotically distributed 
as a chi-square 2( ) , with degrees of freedom equal to the number of ‘zero restrictions’, irrespective of the 
integrated order  (0) or (1)I I , nonintegrated or cointegrated of arbitrary order. All in all, the use of the Toda 
and Yamamoto (1995) approach allows the usual test statistic for Granger causality retains the standard 
asymptotic distribution to obtain a robust inference.  To undertake Toda and Yamamoto (1995) version of 
the Granger non-causality test, we represent the government expenditure-real GDP models in the following 
VAR system:   
 
Model 1a: 
  
max max max max max
max
0 1 2 1 3 1 2
1 1 1 1 1
3 1
1
ln ln ln
k d k d k d k d k d
t i t i t i t i j t j
i i i i jk d
m t m t
m
GE GE lnY lnP GE lnY
lnP
     
 
    
   
    


     
 
    
   (1.19) 
 
Model 1b: 
  
max max max max max
max
0 1 2 1 3 1 2
1 1 1 1 1
3 1
1
ln ln ln
k d k d k d k d k d
t i t i t i t i j t j
i i i i jk d
m t m t
m
GE GE lnY lnP GE lnY
lnP
     
 
    
   
    


     
 
    
   (1.20) 
 
Model 2:  
max max max max max
max
0 1 2 1 3 1 2
1 1 1 1 1
3 2
1
ln ln
k d k d k d k d k d
t i t i t i t i j t j
i i i i jk d
m t m t
m
lnY lnY GE lnP lnY GE
lnP
     
 
    
   
    


     
 
    
   (1.21) 
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Model 3:   
max max max max
0 1 2 1 2 4
1 1 1 11
k d k d k d k d
i i j t
i i i jt t i t t i t j
GE GE Y GE Yln ln ln ln lnY Y P Y P     
   
      
                                      (1.22) 
 
Model 4:   
     
   
      
                                   
max max max max
0 1 2 1 2 5
1 1 1 11
k d k d k d k d
i i j t
i i i jt t i t t i t j
G G Y G Yln ln ln ln lnP P P P P   (1.23) 
 
Model 5:   
     
   
 
    
                       
max max max max
0 1 2 1 1 2 6
1 1 1 1
k d k d k d k d
i t i j t j t
i i i jt t i t i
G G Gln ln lnY ln lnYY Y Y   (1.24) 
 
From Eqs. 1.19 to 1.24, k  is the optimal lag length and maxd  is the maximum order of integration in 
the system. While 1 2 3 4 5, , , ,,t t t t t      and  6t  are error terms that are assumed to be white noise.  In our 
application, the optimal lag length ( )l  is determined using Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), Schwarz 
Criteria (SC), the modified LR test (LR), the Final prediction error (FPE) and the Hannan-Quin information 
criterion (HQ). In all cases, the optimal lag length of two [ 2 ]l  is selected. With optimal lag lengths 
determined, the existing causative process can be easily identified, for example, in Eq. 1.19, Granger causality 
from: (i) tY  to tGE  implies that:  2 0 i , (ii) tP  to tGE  indicating that:   3 0 i ; and (iii) both  tY  
and tP  to tGE (joint effect) implies that:   2 3 0 i , and considering Eq. 1.20, tGE  Granger cause tY  
only if   2 0 i , while causality runs from tP  to tY  only if   3 0 i , meanwhile both tGE and tP  will 
jointly influence tY only if    2 3 0 i . It is worth noting that,  following Toda-Yamamoto procedure, 
the ‘augmented’ VAR(k ) models are computed using seemingly unrelated regression SUR (see Rambaldi 
and Doran 1996; Wold-Rufael 2008:276) even if there is no cointegration, as long as the order of integration 
of the process does not exceed the true lag length of the model (Toda and Yamamoto, 1995:225). Notably, 
irrefutable support for Wagner’s law requires unidirectional causality from real GDP to government 
expenditure, which implies the rejection of null hypothesis, 1H  of Granger causality running from exogenous 
variables (on the left-hand side) to explanatory variables on the right-hand side) of Eqs. 1.19 to 1.24, but 
accept the alternative hypothesis, oH  suggest causal flow in the opposite direction (from endogenous 
variables to the exogenous variable).   
 
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
5.1.  Stationarity Test Results 
 
Although our preferred ARDL chosen to validate co-integration between the selected variables 
provides reliable inference on long-run equilibrium and precludes pre-testing stationarity properties of time 
series, yet it is standard in the literature for recent studies on Wagner’s law to identify the integration order 
of variables and test for unit roots (e.g. see, Herenkson, 1993; Oxley, 1994).  To obviate spurious regression 
associated with non-stationary series, we use the more efficient univariate DF-GLS test for autoregressive 
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unit root proposed by Elliot et al. (1996) and Phillip-Perron (1988) to test the stationarity properties of the 
interested variables.   
The preferred unit root tests are superior to the traditional ADF test. The DF-GLS is an augmented 
version of traditional Dickey-Fuller (1979) t-test since it applies generalized least squares (GLS) to detrend 
time series before running the ADF test regression. Compared to ADF tests, the DF-GLS test has the best 
overall performance in terms of sample size and power. It has substantially improved power when an 
unknown mean or trend is present (Elliot et al. 1996), while the ADF test suffers from low power.  Whereas, 
the PP test is an extension of the Dickey-Fuller test, which corrects for autocorrelation and is more robust in 
the case of weakly autocorrelated and heteroscedastic regression residuals. Also, it is more powerful than the 
ADF test for aggregate data.  The stationarity test results for all the selected variables are reported in Table 1 
in the Appendix. All variables are stationary in (1)I , i.e. integrated order of one at 5% significance level.   
We also applied the Breusch-Godfrey LM test and ARCH LM tests to assess the homoscedastic and 
uncorrelated properties of the residuals, while the Jacque-Bera (JB) test is used to test the normality of the 
residuals. Our results show that the residuals are uncorrelated, homoscedastic and normally distributed at a 
5% significance level, reported in Tables 2 and 3 in the Appendix. Next, the parameter constancy (i.e. 
stability) of the estimated parsimonious models is investigated employing the Cumulative Sum (CUSUM) 
and Cumulative Sum of Squares (CUSUMSQ) of recursive residuals prescribed by Brown et al. (1975). The 
CUSUM plots are illustrated in Figure 3 in the Appendix, indicating that the test statistic was within the 5% 
significant level suggesting the absence of any significant structural instability. 
 
5.2.  Co-integration Test Results  
 
Having established the stationarity properties of the time series, the next question is to ask whether 
there are some possible long-run and short-run relationship between real government expenditure, real GDP 
and population for the FS province from the estimated models. To specify a parsimonious ARDL model, we 
employ Hendry (1986) general-to-specific procedure. All estimated ARDL models in this fashion are 
subjected to diagnostic tests to assess the univariate properties of the residuals of the models to ensure that 
these error terms are homoscedastic and uncorrelated prior testing for cointegration as pre-requisite 
conditions to be satisfied discussed in Section 4.  
In what follows,  we proceed to identify the long-run relationship and inter-temporal causal links 
between the aggregate government expenditures (including other measuring units such as, per capita 
expenditures and share of government expenditure in income), real GDP ( including other measures such as, 
per capita income) and population in the trivariate models 1a and 1b, presented in Eqs1.13 to 1.18. The results 
are presented in Table 2. In all cases, the F-statistics on the joint significance of the lagged levels of variables 
exceeds the 5% upper bound critical value, except in model 1b where F-statistics exceeds 1%, but, the result 
is inconclusive in model 5. Generally speaking, the results of the ARDL suggests the existence of a long-run 
relationship in the estimated models.  
Since the results in Table 2 supports the existence of cointegration, the evidence of a long-run 
equilibrium is inferred by the inclusion of the ECT term in parsimonious ARDL models as estimated in Eqs. 
1.13 to 1.18. Results presented in Table 3 shows the expected statistically significant negative ECT only in 
the constructed trivariate P-W model. This result is consistent with Wagner’s law, which is strongly 
confirmed the significant t- statistics test developed by Pesaran et al. (2001). By implication of this finding 
are two folds. First, in response to any external shock(s) introduced into the system or the provincial economy, 
there is a slow revision to long-run equilibrium (steady-state) of about 43%. Second, the long-run causality 
flows from both real GDP (and population) to aggregate government expenditures.  
Likewise, note that even though a long-run relationship is observed in the bivariate model 2 compared 
to the evidence of no cointegration in models 3, 4 and 5.  The long-run causal flow from aggregate 
government expenditure to real GDP per capita is rejected based on the coefficient of the ECT term, which 
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is positive and statistically significant. A similar finding is reported by Gadinabokao et al. (2013) for South 
Africa. On a technicality, this inference implies that, in the presence of external shocks, the divergence 
between aggregate government expenditure and per capita income growth will persist, but the subsequent 
increase in aggregate expenditure will induce a positive influence on real GDP per capita growth. Also, 
evidence of no long-run causality is inferred in model 2.  
 
5.3. Causality Test Results 
 
To use the Toda-Yamamoto non-Granger Causality (Wald) test to identify the underlying causative 
flow in the short-run in our parsimonious ARDL model. Being cautious not to overfit the ‘augmented’ VAR 
(k ) models in Eqs. 1.19 to 1.24,  the optimal lag length ( )l  was determined using Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC), Schwarz Criteria (SC), the modified LR test (LR), the Final prediction error (FPE) and the 
Hannan-Quin information criterion (HQ). Subsequent results suggest optimal lag length is two [ 2 ]l .   
The results of the Toda-Yamamoto non-Granger Causality Wald test are reported in Table 4. The 
causality results reported in Table 4 suggests that the null hypothesis of no Granger causality can be in 
rejected in both directions in model 1a, implying a bi-directional causality running between real government 
expenditure and real GDP in the short-run. Also, an inference of uni-directionality running from population 
to both real government expenditure and real GDP in the short-run is evident in model 1a. In other models 2 
to 5, we find no evidence of supporting short-run causal flow in other models.  
To this end, our empirical findings on long-run and short-run relationships between the government 
expenditure and real GDP for the Free State province is consistent with those reported in the studies of 
Ziramba (2008), Alimi (2014) and Odhiambo (2015) for South Africa, but at odds with the findings of 
Menyah et al. (2012) for South Africa. In part, the evidence of no causality found in models 2 to 5 aligns with 
the findings of Ansari et al. (1997) for South Africa.  
 
5.4.  Long-run Income elasticities and Voracity effect results.  
 
To augment our empirical analysis, we estimated both short and long-run elasticities of real 
government expenditure to real GDP for the FS province. This practical exercise is congruent with the central 
idea of Wagner’s law that income elasticity relative to government expenditures should be greater than unity 
since the latter rises faster than income growth. Using the specified parsimonious ARDL models, to obtain 
both long-run and short-run income elasticity estimates, we normalised the coefficients aggregate 
government expenditure relative to all lagged endogenous variables. Obtained results reveal that a real GDP 
elasticity ranging from 0.99 to 1.2, implying that a 1% increase in real GDP leads to a 0.99 to 1.2% increase 
in real government expenditure. This empirical evidence, therefore, shows that provincial government 
expenditure rises faster than the increase in (regional) income, which is consistent with Wagner’s law in the 
case of South Africa province.  
In the extant Africa literature, our results are consistent with Menyah et al. (2012) reported a long-run 
income elasticity ranging from 1.12 to 1.57 for South Africa in the Peacock-Wiseman (1961) model, as well 
as, Menyah et al. (2013) based on the obtained income elasticity ranging from 1.73 to 1.79 for Ethiopia in 
the long-run using annual data spanning 1950 -2007. Our findings align with those reported in international 
literature. For example, Akitoby et al. (2006) found a long-run income elasticity ranging from 1.28 to 2.7 in 
a panel dataset for 51 developing countries, while Kumar (2009) used five functional forms of Wagner’s law 
same as this study, and found a long-run income elasticity between 0.75 and 1.16 in a panel of five Asian 
countries.  
While, Lamartina et al. (2010) observed a long-run income elasticity exceeding unity for 23 OECD 
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countries in a panel dataset covering 1970 to 2006, Tasseven (2011) reported an income elasticity of 0.54 for 
Turkey from non-ratio versions of Wagner’s functional form. For New Zealand, Kumar (2012) found income 
elasticity ranging from 0.56 to 0.84 in per capita income relative to the share of government expenditure in 
income over the period studied (1960-2007), whereas, a recent study by Atasoy (2016) for China over the 
period 1982 to 2011, reveals a  long-run income elasticity between 1.32 to 1.38 for China. For similar findings 
on income elasticity, see, for example, Ashan et al. (1996) for Canada, Islam (2001) for the United States, 
Kolluri et al. (2000) for G7 countries and Arpaia et al. (2008) for OECD countries.   
To conclude, we considered the widely accepted notion of voracity effect and cyclical ratcheting in 
studies focusing on the influence of external shocks on government expenditure in public finance. Voracity 
effect is referred to the impact of an (external) positive shock to income-generating a more than proportional 
increase in public spending, even when this shock is transitory, whereas, cyclical ratcheting refers to the 
tendency for the government spending-to-GDP ratio to rise during recessions and to be only partially reduced 
during expansions (Akitoby, 2006:990).   
Finally, following Akitoby (2006), we attempt to find out whether ‘voracity effect’ is relevant to 
aggregate expenditure growth at the provincial level. Specifically, obtained results suggest a short-run 
elasticity of total government expenditure ranging between 0.49 to 2.12% in response to a given shock to real 
GDP in FS province. This positive and statistically significant elasticity coefficient, which is greater than 
unity implying that, in response to a given shock to real GDP, aggregate government expenditure will increase 
more in percentage terms. This inference is consistent with Akitoby (2006), and, corroborate the reported 
findings by Alm et al. (2010) for South Africa, where empirical results assert that external shocks have a 
significantly positive effect on per capita government expenditure, therefore, external shocks play an 
important role in explaining the dynamic of growth in government expenditure at the national level. 
 
 
6. POLICY IMPLICATION OF EMPIRICAL FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
All the empirical evidence in this study substantiate the preliminary analysis on the trend of growth in 
government expenditure, economic growth and government revenue of the Free State province, which reveals 
a rapidly growing expenditure relative to government revenue and economic activity level. Our empirical 
results have important policy implication for the provincial government as follows. First, given the shrinking 
fiscal space, gradual reduction of the PES, severely low aggregate revenue compared to the increasing 
expenditure on education, health and social welfare etc., the provincial government should be cautious about 
its present and future spending as extra public spending is unlikely to cause higher income in the long run in 
the current tight financial condition.  
Second, the provincial government needs to understand the complexity of utilising its expenditure to 
stimulate growth since there evidence of dynamic feedback between government expenditure and real GDP 
is established favouring both Wagner’s law and Keynesian theory. As a result, on one hand, the provincial 
government need to balance its aggregate expenditure on public goods, services and political mandates to 
avoid crowding out economic and labour productivity growth through high public spending despite the 
prevailing socio-economic conditions, such as high unemployment rate (about 31% on strict definition) and 
acute poverty. On the other hand, given the concrete evidence supporting Wagner’s law, growth in per capita 
income (economic growth) has become determinant of aggregate government expenditure, even so, the 
provincial government has to achieve higher growth to cope with the growing demand for social and 
infrastructure expenditure  
Third, the evidence of long-run and short-run flow from real income to aggregate government 
expenditure, which is consistent with Wagner’s law shed light on the irrefutable argument opposing the 
prevalent apriori decision in the policy circle to boost economic growth by increasing aggregate government 
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expenditure. This policy stance is very precarious for the provincial government, thus, the provincial 
government must reduce its role in creating employment opportunities, instead, the government should 
provide a conducive economic-, social- and political - environment for vibrant private sector participation in 
the local economy, which in turn, facilitate entrepreneurial and private job opportunities. Along this line, 
insofar, the Free State government remains the largest employer in the province (StatsSA, Quarterly Labour 
Market Review, 2016:Q1-Q4), the provincial government needs to continue its proactive efforts, through 
strict fiscal consolidation stance, to reduce its public size by minimizing public sector employment which has 
resulted into a considerable large wage bill, which is presently unsustainable.  
Fourth, the provincial government can spur the prevalent weak economic growth directly by 
harmonising its efforts to intensify infrastructure investment, and indirectly via a well-structured 
accumulation of human capital targeting the youths. This strategy would improve the labour absorption rate, 
raise aggregate productivity, reduce unemployment and poverty rate. Nevertheless, since Devarajan et al. 
(1996:338) argued that excessive use of productive public expenditure can become unproductive, hence, high 
public expenditure on non-productive public goods and services will have no effect on economic growth. For 
instance, it would be beneficial for the provincial government to carefully evaluate its expenditure on the 
state-sponsored education bursary aimed at building a knowledge endowed state and human capital necessary 
to sustain economic growth. As such, the provincial government to determine the sizeable educational 
spending on a bursary is productive, and also be able to track its return on investment (ROI) by taking into 
account the number of state-sponsored graduates that re-invest their accrued human capital gains into the 
domestic economy, to improve growth, as well as, enhance total labour productivity.  
 
 
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In this study, we contribute to the scarce literature on Wagner’s law in South Africa using novel 
econometric techniques. Most importantly, we dealt with the weaknesses of earlier studies, as well as, close 
the current research gap by using provincial data to empirically test the applicability of Wagner’s Law at a 
sub-national government level, in this case, the Free State province using a quarterly data for period 2001:Q1 
to 2014:Q4. The long-run relationship and direction of causality in the short-run among variables is confirmed 
employing advanced econometric models, namely the ARDL–bound test model proposed by Pesaran et al. 
(2001) and Toda-Yamamoto causality test by Toda and Yamamoto (1995). The general-to-specific procedure 
to estimate parsimonious ARDL models to obtain robust empirical results that are consistent with postulated 
theories. 
Our empirical results are summarized as follows. First, we find evidence for a bi-directional causal 
link between total provincial government expenditure and economic growth in the short run, while economic 
growth Granger-causes government expenditure in the long-run. This result is consistent with the findings of 
Ziramba (2012), Odhiambo (2016) and Alimi (2013) for South Africa, but at odds with the findings of 
Menyah et al. (2012), where Wagner’s law is confirmed for South Africa. Surprisingly, we find evidence of 
no causal relations in the estimated models 2, 3, 4 and 5 testing Wagner’s Law which also aligns with the 
findings of Ansari et al. (1996) for South Africa.  Second, as predicted by Wagner’s Law, income elasticity 
estimate results show a long-run income elasticity ranging from 0.99 to 1.2%, which implies that in the Free 
State province, a 1% increase in real economic growth will cause total government expenditure to rise by 
0.99 – 1.2%. This finding is aligned with the reported income elasticity of 1.12 to 1.57 by Menyah et al. 
(2012) for South Africa. Third, we infer a unidirectional causal flow (long-run forcing) from population 
growth to both economic growth and total provincial government expenditure in the short-run, an indicative 
of the influence of demographic factor on the provincial fiscus and development.  Fourth, given the stylized 
conjecture of ‘voracity effect’  in public finance, the result shows that total government expenditure can rise 
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by 0.49 – 2.12% in the short-run, in response to a positive shock, indicative of idiosyncratic shocks playing 
a key role in explaining the evolving pattern in government expenditure. This is in line with the findings of 
Akitoby (2006), and Alm et al. (2010) for South Africa.  
Based on our empirical findings, on policy front; it is expedient the provincial government to continue 
with the adopted fiscal consolidation strategies in the province to enhance the effective allocation of limited 
fiscal resources, curb wasteful public spending and reduce government size, which in turn, would effectively 
curtail the bulging wage bill by restricting public sector employment and streamlining duplicative functions 
across provincial departments. Additionally, the provincial government need to continue reducing its public 
size (i.e. role-play) in the economic structure to allow private sector productivity needed to sustain economic 
growth. Furthermore, the evidence of a bi-directional causal link between economic growth and government 
expenditure necessitates the need for policymakers to cautiously balance both current and future public 
expenditures in order not to crowd-out output and labour productivity. Finally, the provincial government 
need to shift its focus on identifying productive expenditure across provincial departments and adopt a policy 
shift towards capital infrastructure to ease the prevailing structural bottlenecks, thereby inducing an indirect 
positive influence on economic activities level in the province.   
 
 
APPENDIX: LIST OF FIGURES & TABLES 
Figure 3: CUSUM Parameter Constancy (Stability) Test for Parsimonious ARDL models 
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Source: Author, Eviews10.  
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Figure 3 continued: CUSUM Parameter Constancy (Stability) Test for Parsimonious ARDL models 
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Table 1: Stationarity (unit-root) Test results 
 DF-GLS PP 
Variables Levels First Difference Levels First Difference 
lnY  -3.456 -2.763*** -2.104 -2.987* 
lnGE  -2.438 -2.635*** -1.738 -2.829* 
lnP  0.636 -3.473*** 4.171 -3.241** 
ln Y P( )  -3.603 -2.608** -2.279 -3.354** 
ln GE P( )  -3.032 -2.521** -2.044 -3.164** 
ln GE Y( )  0.089 -2072** -0.083 -8.536*** 
Note: Test Critical Values for DF-GLS at 1% level =-2.607, 5% level =-1.946 and 10% =-1.612, while the Adj.t-
Stats for PP test at 1% level =-3.552, 5% =-2.914 and 10% = -2.595.  
***,** &* denote p-value at 1%, 5% and 10% in parenthesis.   
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Table 2: Parsimonious ARDL –Bound Test results for Cointegration.   
Estimated Models  Dependent Variable Function   F-Test Statistics p-value  
1a ( )ln tGE   ,GEF GE Y P   6.5805** 0.001  
1b ( )ln tY   G , PYF EY   5.0107* 0.005  
2 ln( )tGE   GEF Y P   10.391** 0.000  
3  ln GE Y   GE YF Y P   5.326** 0.009  
4  ln GE P   GE PF Y P   13.596** 0.000  
5  ln G Y  ( )GE YF Y   3.4185‡ 0.043  
Asymptotic critical values – Case III (Models 1, 3 and 5) 
  1% 5% 10% 
  I(0) 1(1) I(0) 1(1) I(0) 1(1) 
  5.920 7.179 4.083 5.207 3.330 4.347 
Asymptotic Critical Values – Case V (Models 2 and 4) 
  1% 5% 10% 
  I(0) 1(1) I(0) 1(1) I(0) 1(1) 
  9.895 10.965 6.8985 7.860 5.780 6.540 
***,** &* denote p-value at 1%, 5% and 10% . 
Note: Narayan (2005), p.1988, Case III (unrestricted intercept, no trend) and Case V: Unrestricted Intercept and unrestricted Trend).  
Models 1, 3 and 5 modelled without trend, while models 2, and 4 are estimated with trend components. ‡Cointegration relationship is 
inconclusive.  For models 1a &1b, N=43 and 2k  , while in models 2 to 5, N=48 and 1k   
 
Table 3: Parsimonious ARDL – Bound Test Procedure results for Long-run and short-run Relationships.   
  Short-run Causality (Wald or Pairwise F-test) Long-run Causality 
  F-Statistics (probability) 6 1i tECT    
Estimated 
Models Dependent Variable ln tGE  lnYt  lnPt    ln Y P  ECT coefficient [t-statistic] 
1a   ln tGE   -  46.552 (0.000)***  - -0.43 [-2.13]** 
1b lnYt  9.692 (0.000)*** N/a  - 
-0.04 
[-0.23] 
 lnPt  4.459 (0.041)** 
0.081 
(0.776)  - 
- 
 
2   ln tGE   - -  49.755 (0.000)*** 0.43 [3.64]** 
3  ln GE Y  - -  21.723 (0.000) *** 0.002 [0.10] 
4  ln GE P  - -  4.750 (0.034)** 0.79 [5.23]** 
5  ln GE Y  - 11.976 (0.000)***  - -0.004 [-0.21] 
 Error Correction Models 1a 1b 2 3 4 5 
 2R  0.78 0.64 0.79 0.52 0.71 0.52 
 DW 1.52 1.84 2.21 1.93 2.11 2.18 
 SER 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.10 0.03 
 B-G SC (2 lags) 4.31(0.11) 0.78(0.67) 1.78(0.40) 0.31(0.85) 0.82(0.66) 1.27(0.52) 
 ARCH (2 lags) 0.02(0.98) 0.01(0.85) 1.13(0.56) 0.35(0.89) 0.11(0.94) 1.69(0.42) 
 JB Stat ( df) 17.7(0.79) 60.6(0.48) 4.49(0.10) 9.31(0.11) 76.1(0.36) 65.2(0.17) 
***,** &* denote p-value at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively, p-value are in (  ) parenthesis while t – statistics for rejecting the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration are in [  ] . Notes: Critical values for the F-statistics were obtained from Narayan (2005, p. 1988), Table III. While, the t-test, critical values 
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are from Pesaran et al. (2001, p. 303).    
  
Table 4: Toda-Yamamoto non-Granger causality test results  
Trivariate non-linear model: Model 1a and 1b 
Null hypothesis: 0H  Function Test Statistic   2  p-value Inference 
Y does not Granger-cause GE    ,PGEF GE Y  15.954 0.014*** Reject 0H  
P  does not Granger-cause GE   ,PGEF GE Y  18.103 0.006** Reject 0H  
GE  does not Granger-cause Y   G ,PYF EY  12.740 0.047** Reject 0H  
P  does not Granger-cause Y   G ,PYF EY  19.000 0.004** Reject 0H  
Bi-variate non-linear models 2 to 5 
Null hypothesis: 0H  Function Test Statistic  2  p-value Inference 
GE  does not Granger-cause Y P   GEF Y P  0.014 0.993 Accept 0H  
Y P  does not Granger-cause GE   GEF Y P  5.074 0.079*** Reject 0H  
GE Y does not Granger-cause Y P   GE YF Y P  2.482 0.289 Accept 0H  
Y P  does not Granger-cause GE Y   GE YF Y P  0.917 0.631 Accept 0H  
GE P  does not Granger-cause Y P   GE PF Y P  0.177 0.914 Accept 0H  
Y P  does not Granger-causeGE P   GE PF Y P  0.056 0.972 Accept 0H  
GE Y  does not Granger-cause Y  ( )GE YF Y  0.545 0.761 Accept 0H  
Y  does not Granger-cause GE Y  ( )GE YF Y  1.183 0.553 Accept 0H  
Note: ***,** &*  denote p-value at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level.  
Table B.I: A summarized survey of empirical studies supporting Wagner’s Law. 
Cross-sectional studies 
Author Econometric Technique Used Evidence for Sample period   
Ram (1986) Cross-section  (Pooled time series) 96 countries*  115 countries: 1960 - 1980 
Hsieh and Lai (1994) VAR and Granger causality  Germany, Italy and the US G7 countries: 1885 - 1987 
Kolluri (2000) 2 step E-G and ECM   G7 countries  G7 countries: 1960-1993 
Chang (2002) JJ and ECM  Thailand   3 developed and 3 developing Asian  countries: 1950-1996 
Iyare and Lorde (2004) 2 step E-G and Granger causality tests Guyana 9 Caribbean countries:  
Akitoby et al. (2006) ECM  70% of countries studied 51 developing countries: 1970-2002 
Ansari et al. (1997)  Holmes-Hutton and Granger causality test Ghana 
Ghana (1963-1988), Kenya 
(1964-1989) and South Africa 
(1957-1990  
Grenade and Wright (2014) 
Panel Dynamic OLS, Granger causality 
and Baek and Brock(1992) nonlinear 
causality test 
Barbados, St Vincent and 
Grenadines  
4 Caribbean countries:  1980-
2011 
Narayan et al. (2008) Panel co-integration (Pedroni) test and ECM 
Small panels of China’s 
western and Eastern 
provinces 
Chinese provinces Eastern and 
Western provinces 
Kumar (2009)  Gregory Hansen (1996) structural break co-integration test 4 out of 5 Asian countries  6 Asian countries:1960-2007 
Lamartina et al. (2010) ARDL and Wald F-statistic test   OECD countries  23 OECDs: 1970-200 
Kariagianni et al. (2011) E-G and JJ cointegration tests France and Italy* EU-15  
Kariagianni et al. (2011) E-G and JJ cointegration tests France and Italy* EU-15  
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Table B.I continue A summarized survey of empirical studies supporting Wagner’s Law. 
Cross-sectional studies 
Author Econometric Technique Used Evidence for Sample period   
Magazzino et al. (2012a) Panel cointegration test and Granger causality  
Austria, Germany, 
Netherlands, Portugal and 
Spain 
Euro area: 1990-2010 
Magazzino et al. (2012b) 2-step E-G and JJ cointegration tests, Granger causality and ECM 
14 EU countries out of  
EU-27 EU-27:1970-2009 
Khan and Bashar  (2015) 2 step E-G and JJ cointegration tests and Granger causality  Australia 
Australia and New Zealand: 
1980-2012 
Ashan et al. (1992) Granger causality (add money stock)  
UK and Japan in both 
univariate and trivariate 
model 
G6 (excluding the U.S): 
1960-1980 
Loizides et al. (2004) JJ, Granger causality and ECM 
Greece and UK (when 
inflation is included in a 
trivariate model) 
Greece, UK and Ireland: 
1950-1995  
Paleologlu et al. (2015) Semi-parametric estimates in a partial linear model. 
Developing countries in 
linear and nonlinear models 
5 developing; 5 developed 
and 5 relatively poor EU 
countries:1960-2007 
    
Country-specific studies  
Author Econometric Technique Used Evidence for Sample period   
Ghali (1997) VAR and Granger causality test Saudi Arabia  (weak evidence) 1960 - 1996 
Islam (2001) JJ and E-G cointegration tests US 1929 -1996 
Srinivasan (2013) JJ cointegration test; VECM and Granger causality India 1973 - 2012 
Seeber and Dockel  (1978) OLS South Africa 1948 -1975 
Abedian et al. (1984)  OLS South Africa  1920 - 1982 
Ziramba (2008) ARDL and TY  South Africa  1960 - 2006 
Alm et al. (2010) JJ cointegration test, ECM and Granger causality  South Africa  1960 - 2007 
Kojo and Wolde-Rafael (2012) ARDL, E-G and ECM  South Africa  1950 - 2007 
Odhiambo (2015) ARDL and Granger causality South Africa 1970 - 2013 
Tsauri and Odhiambo (2013) ARDL and Granger causality  Zimbabwe 1980 - 2011 
Salwindi et al. (2016) JJ and Granger causality Zambia  1980 - 2013 
Thabane and Lebina (2016) ARDL, 2-step E-G and ECM Lesotho 1980 - 2012 
Danladi et al. (2015) ARDL, JJ and Granger causality  Nigeria 1980 - 2013 
Ogbuagbu et al. (2015) ARDL and TY Nigeria  1970 - 2014 
Ibok et al. (2016)  JJ and Granger causality  Nigeria (Agriculture sector) 1961 - 2012 
Oyinlola et al. (2013) Gregory-Hansen structural break cointegration test and ECM Nigeria  1961 - 2009 
Dada et al. (2013) JJ and VECM Nigeria 1961 - 2011 
Lawal et al. (2015) JJ  and Granger causality  Nigeria (heath, transport &communication sectors) 1977 - 2012 
Cormelus et al. (2016) OLS (multivariate regression) Nigeria 1980 - 2012 
Ahmad and Longanathan 
(2016) 
Bootstrap non-Granger causality with a 
fixed rolling window 
Nigeria (for sub-period of 
1985 – 1995) 1960 - 2014 
Salih (2012)  JJ, 2-step E-G coint.test , Granger causality and ECM  Sudan  1970 - 2010 
Kamasa et al. (2015)  JJ and Granger -Sim causality  Ghana 1980 - 2010 
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Table B.I continue: A summarized survey of empirical supporting Wagner’s Law. 
Country-specific studies 
Author Econometric Technique Used Evidence for Sample period   
Salih (2012)  JJ, 2-step E-G coint.test , Granger causality and ECM  Sudan  1970 - 2010 
Kamasa et al. (2015)  JJ and Granger -Sim causality  Ghana 1980 - 2010 
Menyah et al. (2015) ARDL and TY Ethiopia 1950 - 2007 
Kalam (2009)  2-step EG cointegration test, JJ and Granger causality  Bangladesh 1976 - 2007 
Al-Zeoud (2013) 2-step EG cointegration test, JJ, VECM and Granger causality  Jordan 1990 - 2011 
Tasseven (2011) VECM, TY and JJ Turkey (trivariate model) 1960 - 2006 
Govindaraju et al. (2011) ARDL and Granger causality  Malaysia (trivariate model) 1970 - 2006 
Permana et al. (2012) ARDL and GARCH  Indonesia 1990 - 2011 
Pahlvani et al. (2011)  ARDL, TY and Granger causality  Iran 1960 - 2008 
Sideris (2007) JJ and Granger causality  Greece 1833 - 1938 
Magazzino (2010)  OLS, FGLS, ARIMAX, GARCH, Finite mixture model, CB Italy (weak evidence)  1960 - 2008 
Kumar et al. (2009)  Fully modified OLS (FMOLS), ARDL, 2-step E-G and JJ New Zealand 
1960 - 2007 
 
 
Pahlvani et al. (2011)  ARDL, TY and Granger causality  Iran 1960 - 2008 
Sideris (2007) JJ and Granger causality  Greece 1833 - 1938 
Magazzino (2010)  OLS, FGLS, ARIMAX, GARCH, Finite mixture model, CB Italy (weak evidence)  1960 - 2008 
Kumar et al. (2009)  Fully modified OLS (FMOLS), ARDL, 2-step E-G and JJ New Zealand 
1960 - 2007 
 
 
Szarowská (2009) JJ and Generalised methods of moments (GMM) Czech Republic  1995- 2008 
Cotsomitis (1996) E-G China 1952 - 1998 
Atasoy (2016) ARDL, TY and Granger causality  China 1982 - 2011 
Note: VAR = vector autoregressive model;   E-G = Engle-Granger (1987); JJ = Johansen Juselieus cointegration test. ECM = Error correction 
model; VECM = vector autoregressive model; OLS = Ordinary least square; ARDL = Autoregressive distributed lag-bound testing and TY= Toda 
Yamamoto causality test; FGLS = Feasible Generalized Least Squares; CB= Cobb Douglas Production function.  
 
Table B.2: A summarized survey of empirical studies supporting the Keynesian hypothesis. 
Cross-sectional studies 
Author Econometric Technique Evidence for Sample period   
Landau (1986)   104 Countries: Summer-Heston data 
Hsieh and Lai (1994) VAR and Granger causality  Canada, Japan and UK G7 countries: 1885-1987 
Iyare and Lorde  (2004) 2-step E-G and Granger causality At least 7 Caribbean countries 9 Caribbean countries: Varied periods 
Dogan et al. (2006) JJ  and Granger causality  Philippines  5 East Asian countries: 1960 - 2002 
Zammanian et al. (2012) TY  Bangladesh, China, Pakistan Philippines and Syrian Arab Rep 
12 Asian countries: 
1960-2009 
Khan et al. (2015) JJ, E-G causality test and ECM New Zealand (on education and health public spending) 
Australia and New 
Zealand: 1980-2012 
Paleologou et al. (2015)  Semi-parametric estimates in a partial linear model. 
Developed countries 
(nonlinear model) 
5 developing; 5 
developed and 5 
relatively poor EU 
countries:1960-2007 
Country-specific studies 
Author Econometric Technique Evidence for Sample period   
Holmes and Hutton (1990) Holmes –Hutton multiple rank  F- causality test  India 1950 - 1981 
Tulsidharan et al. (2006) 2 step E-G cointegration test, ECM and Granger Causality India 1960 - 2002 
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Table B.2 continue: A summarized survey of empirical studies supporting the Keynesian hypothesis. 
Country-specific studies 
Author Econometric Technique Evidence for Sample period   
Babatunde et al. (2011) ARDL and TY  Nigeria  (weak evidence) 1970 - 2006 
Omoke et al. (2009) JJ and Granger causality  Nigeria 1970 - 2009 
Ighodaro et al. (2010) JJ and Granger causality  Nigeria 1961 - 2007 
Sevitenyi (2012) JJ, TY  and Granger causality  Nigeria  1960 - 2009 
Lawal et al. (2015) JJ and Granger causality  Nigeria (agricultural sector) 1977 - 2012 
Amin (2011) JJ, TY and Granger causality  Bangladesh  1976  -2009 
Yilgör et al. (2012) VAR and Granger causality  Turkey  1980 - 2010 
Künü et al, (2015a) 2-step E-G cointegration test, JJ and Granger causality  Turkey  1990 - 2012 
Künü et al, (2015b) ARDL and ECM  Turkey  1970 - 2012 
Govindaraju et al. (2011) ARDL and Granger causality  Malaysia (multivariate model) 1970 - 2006 
Gürgül et al. (2012) 2-step E-G cointegration test,  TY and VAR Poland  2001:Q1 - 2008:Q3 
    
Country-specific studies 
Author Econometric Technique Evidence for Sample period   
Ashan et al. (1992) Granger causality  US and Canada G7 (excluding U.S): 1960 - 1980 
Afxentiou et al. (1996) 2-step E-G and Granger causality   EU countries: 1961 - 1991 
Grenade and Wright (2014) 
Panel Dynamic OLS, Granger causality test 
and Baek et al. (1992) nonlinear causality 
test 
Grenada and St. Lucia 4 Caribbean countries:  1980-2011 
Huang (2006)  China and Taiwan  
Narayan et al. (2008) Panel cointegration (Pedroni) test, ECM and VAR Full panel of Asian countries 
Chinese Eastern and 
Western provinces: 
varied periods 
Safdri et al. (2012) Panel cointegration test (Pedroni and Kao tests) and Panel-VECM 17 Asian developing countries 
27 Asian countries: 
1970 - 2009 
Mahmoodi et al. (2014) Panel cointegration and Granger causality 
Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, 
Taiwan, China, Malaysia, 
Philippines, and Thailand 
20 Asian countries: 
1970 - 2010 
Lahirushan et al. (2014) Panel cointegration (Pedroni and Kao) test 
and Panel-VECM 
Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, 
South Korea, Japan, China, Sri 
Lanka, India and Bhutan 
9 Asian countries: 1970 - 
2013 
Magazzino et al. (2012a) Panel Cointegration test and Granger 
Causality 
Cyprus, France, Greece, Ireland 
and Slovenia 
Euro area: 1990 - 2010 
Note: VAR = vector autoregressive model;   E-G = Engle-Granger (1987); JJ = Johansen Juselieus cointegration test 
ECM = Error correction model; VECM = vector autoregressive model; OLS = Ordinary least square; ARDL = Autoregressive distributed lag-bound 
testing and TY= Toda Yamamoto causality test; FGLS = Feasible Generalized Least Squares; CB= Cobb Douglas Production function. 
 
Table B.III: A summarized survey of empirical supporting both Wagner’s Law and Keynes hypothesis (evidence for bidirectional causality).  
Country-specific  
Author Econometric Technique Evidence for Sample period   
Singh et al. (1984) Granger causality test India 1950 - 1981 
Ziramba (2008) ARDL and TY South Africa 1960 - 2006 
Odhiambo (2015) ARDL, ECM and Granger causality  South Africa (trivariate model) 1970 - 2013 
Alimi et al. (2013) JJ and ECM  Nigeria 1970 - 2012 
Ahmad et al. (2016) Bootstrap non-Granger  causality with a fixed 
rolling window 
Nigeria, period 2011-2014 1961 - 2014 
Mekdad et al. (2014) JJ and Granger causality  Algeria (education expenditure) 1974 - 2012 
Rana (2014) JJ, VECM and Granger causality  Bangladesh 1973 - 2012 
Halicioglu (2003) JJ, and Granger causality Turkey (both bi-variate and trivariate 
models) 
1960 - 2000 
Tasseven (2011) VECM, TY and JJ Turkey  1960 - 2006 
Abu-Eideh (2015) 2-step E-G cointegration test and Granger 
causality 
Palestine  1994 - 2013 
Bojanic (2013) 2-step E-G cointegration test, JJ  and Granger 
causality 
Bolivia (infrastructure, health and 
defence expenditures) 
1940 - 2012 
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 Table B.III continue: A summarized survey of empirical studies supporting both Wagner’s Law and Keynes hypothesis (evidence 
for bidirectional causality).  
Country-specific studies  
Author Econometric Technique Evidence for Sample period   
Bojanic (2013) 2-step E-G cointegration test, JJ  and 
Granger causality 
Bolivia (infrastructure, health 
and defence expenditures) 
1940 - 2012 
Nikolaos et al. (2004) 2-step E-G cointegration test and ECM  Greece 1960 - 2001 
Ritcher and Dinitrios (2012) 2-step E-G cointegration test, JJ  and 
Granger causality 
UK 1885 - 2010 
Cheng et al. (1997) 2-step E-G cointegration test, JJ, 
Hsiao’s Granger causality and VAR  
South Korea (multivariate 
model) 
1954 - 1994 
 
Table B.IV: A summarized survey empirical studies supporting the absence of both Wagner’s Law and Keynes hypothesis 
(evidence for neutrality causality).  
Cross-sectional studies 
Author Econometric Technique Evidence for Sample period   
Ansari et al. (1997) Granger and Holmes-Hutton Causality tests South Africa and Kenya 
3 African 
countries: varied 
periods 
Chang et al. (2004) JJ  South Africa, Australia, New Zealand and Thailand 
10 countries: 1951 
-1996 
Huang (2006) ARDL and TY  China and Taiwan  2 Asian countries: 1979 - 2002 
Oten-Abaiye (2011) Panel cointegration test  Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria and Serra Leone 
5 ECOWAS 
countries: Varied 
data:  
Dogan et al. (2006) JJ and Granger causality  Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. 
5 East Asian 
Countries: 1960 – 
2002  
Magazzino et al. 
(2012a) 
Panel Cointegration test and 
Granger Causality 
Belgium, Estonia, Finland, Italy, 
Luxemburg, Malta and Slovakia 
23 OECD 
countries: 1970 -
2006 
    
Country-specific studies 
Author Econometric Technique Evidence for Sample period   
Sinha et al. (2007) ARDL and TY Thailand  1950 -2003 
Dilrukshini (2009) JJ and Granger causality  Sri Lanka 1952 -2002 
Kesavarajah (2012) JJ, ECM and Granger causality  Sri Lanka 1960 - 2010 
Muhammad et al. 
(2015) JJ and Granger causality  Pakistan 1972 - 2013 
Note: VAR = vector autoregressive model;   E-G = Engle-Granger (1987); JJ = Johansen Juselieus cointegration test; ECM = Error 
correction model; VECM = vector autoregressive model; OLS = Ordinary least square; ARDL = Autoregressive distributed lag-bound 
testing and TY= Toda Yamamoto causality test; FGLS = Feasible Generalized Least Squares; CB= Cobb Douglas Production function.  
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